A. 找人給翻譯一個國際經濟法的案例，關於CISG的，急用，十分感謝。
關於賠償，Globex公司辯駁到，CISG第74條的合適的解讀是賦予賠償責任,作為遭受的特別標識違約的後果「可預見的損失......只是作為實際損失的上限。」 參見CISG條款74（「由一方造成的違約賠償包括[賠償退款種類] ...遭受對方的違約的後果。這樣的賠償不得超過該違約方可預見到的損失......在合同訂立時「）。即使這種說法是正確的，而仲裁員錯誤地解釋第74條款來完全判決為可預見的損失，我們的先例很清楚說明這種情況下，仲裁員並不是明顯無視法律。見美林（Merril Lynch)，皮爾斯(Pierce)，芬納和史密斯公司(Fenner & Smith, Inc.)訴Bobker，808卷，第930，933頁（2D Cir.1986）（「 顯然的漠視法律的......明確地意味著不僅僅是對法律的錯用或誤解「（內部引號略））。華萊士，378 F.3d 在190頁（「我們的案例表明，我們只在對法律准則最惡劣地錯誤使用的案例情況下，使用對法律條款的明確輕視去撤回仲裁員的裁決。」）。
我們已經考慮了Globex的其餘爭議並認為沒有法律依據。
由於上述原因，地方法院的判決是肯定的。（這句你上面沒有，我加上了，比較完整）
B. 什麼地方可以找到國際經濟法的英文案例
Woodtrans Navigation Corporation & SAN WAI Navigation S.A. Panama
I. Parties involved
Applicant: Woodtrans Navigation Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Woodtrans).
Applicant: Sanwai Navigation S.A Panama (hereinafter referred to as Sanwai)
Respondent: Angang Group International Trade Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Angang)
II. Main facts of the case
Angang signed a contract with Billion Golden Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Billion Golden) on Feb. 20th 1995 to sell Billion Golden hot rolling steel for 5,000 tons with FOB price for USD 295 per ton and payment by L/C. on June 30th of the same year, M.V. UNISON PRAISE owned by Woodtrans was loaded with the cargo under above contract at port of Dalian. When the cargo have been loaded on board, the carrier Merpati Lines S.A. (hereinafter referred to as Merpati) issued the original bill of lading in triplicate to Angang. The bill of lading states that: Shipper: Angang, Consignee: to order of PT Bank Bumi Daya (persero) Jakarta Rasuna Said Branch, Port of Loading: Dalian, Port of Destination: Jakarta, Weight of Cargo: 5155.520 ton. On July 21st, UNISON PRAISE arrived at the port of Jakarta, and then the carrier delivered the cargo to the Notify party listed in bill of lading without presentation of the same after the cargo was discharged from the vessel. Upon receipt of the shipped clean bill of lading issued by the carrier, Angang then submitted to the issuing bank through Anshan Branch of China the whole set of documents including original bill of lading, commercial invoice to settle the payment. The value of cargo as recorded by the invoice amounts to USD 1,520,878.4. Above documents are transferred to the issuing bank on July 8th and rejected by the issuing bank because of inconsistence with L/C. Angang received the returned bill of lading and the invoice on August 20th. Woodtrans is the registry owner of the carrying vessel UNISON PRAISE. M.V UNISON GREAT arrested by Dalian Maritime Court and owned by Woodtrans is the sister vessel of UNISON PRAISE. On April 16th 1996, Woodtrans sold UNISON GREAT to Sanwai who changed the name of vessel to SAN WAI. Through the statement from Panama Public Registry Authority, the owner of UNISON PRAISE did not logout the registry. As a result, the owner of this vessel is still Woodtrans.
III. The original judgment of the case
Dalian Maritime Court tried the case and decided that: Since the carrier Merpati issued the bill of lading and delivered the cargo to UNISON PRAISE to undertake the carriage, Woodtrans is in the legal position of actual carrier as provided by Maritime Code of P.R.C. The Bill of Lading is the evidence of contract of goods by sea, and the certificate for title and documents against which the carrier guarantee to deliver the cargo. When the shipper holds the bill of lading, the relationship of right and liability between the carrier and the holder shall be defined as the provisions of bill of lading. It is the legal responsibility of the carrier to deliver the cargo upon presentation of original bill of lading according to the law. According to Article 61 of Maritime Code, it is also the responsibility of the actual carrier to delivery the cargo against the surrendering of bill of lading. Under the time charter party, even the charterer is entitled to direct the master concerning the operation of vessel as provided by Article 136 of Maritime Code, the instruction made by the carrier in the name of the charterer to the master to deliver the cargo without presentation of bill of lading has not only exceed the legal right of the charterer but also violated the forcible obligation for the carrier and the actual carrier to delivery the cargo against the presentation of bill of lading. Woodtrans knew its forcible obligation to delivery the cargo against the presentation of bill of lading but still violated this obligation, which constitutes an illegal act done with intent and shall not be entitled to benefit from the exemption and the limitation of liability as provided by bill of lading and therefore shall take complete responsibility for the losses suffered by Angang. Meantime, Dalian Maritime Court also determined that the flag of SANWAI is Panama. When exercising the arrest of vessel, the identification of the ownership of SANWAI (original UNISON GREAT) shall apply the law of Panama in accordance with Article 270 of Maritime Code. According to Article 1083 and 1089 of Maritime Code of Panama, under any circumstances, the transference of vessel』 ownership would not act against the third party without registry at public authority. Although the buyer obtained the UNISON GREAT, Woodtrans did not register the transference of ownership at public registry authority at Panama when the vessel was arrested by Dalian Maritime Court. Therefore, the vessel still owned by Woodtrans when the court exercised arrest of the vessel. The objection raised by Sanwai with the court is the legal owner of the vessel shall not be sustained. Hence, the court made a judgment: Woodtrans shall compensate Angang for the loss of cargo in amount of RMB 12,700,000 and the interests thereto in rate of 10.98% per month counting from August 20th 1995 to the date the payment actually being paid; dismiss the claim filed by Sanwai who is in a position of owner in claiming for the incorrect arrest of vessel against Angang. Woodtrans and Sanwai refused to accept the judgment of first trial and filed an appeal with the Liaoning Higher People』s Court. The Liaoning Higher People』s Court heard the case and decided that: Angang is the legal holder of the bill of lading who, under the provision of Maritime Code and internal maritime practice, is entitled to claim for the losses of cargo against Woodtrans who delivered the cargo without presentation of bill of lading. Although Woodtrans entered into a time charter party with Merpati, the act of delivery of cargo without presentation of bill of lading was done by UNISON PRAISE ring the performance of time charter party and Woodtrans therefore could not be exempted from the legalized liability. Since UNISON PRAISE carried the cargo under the bill of lading, Woodtrans as the owner of the vessel has acted as the actual carrier under Maritime Code. It is the responsibility not only of the carrier but also the actual carrier to deliver the cargo to the holders who surrender the original bill of lading. Without presentation of original bill of lading, the cargo was delivered to the Notify Party recorded in bill of lading and all the losses suffered by Angang shall be compensated fully by the liability party. UNISON PRAISE owned by Woodtrans shall oblige herself according to the law of China and international maritime practice. Her obeying of the instruction of carrier in delivering of cargo without presentation of bill of lading did not satisfy the condition for exemption, although she enjoyed the right to recourse the losses thereto against the instructor. Therefore the reason for appeal of Woodtrans shall not be supported by the Higher People』s Court. The appeal filed by Sanwai is concerned with objection to the arrest of the vessel before instating an action and is lack of basis for facts and laws because the facts was ascertained at the original proceres for preservation. The appeal has not interested relationship with the concerned disputes of delivery of cargo without presentation of bill of lading and is not provided with the independent claim as required by the law. This appeal is overruled by the court. In the end, Liaoning Higher People』s Court rejected the appeal and affirmed the original judgment.
IV. How is the leading case made:
C. 國際經濟法案例
你可以申請有管復轄權的法院中制止支付信用證項下的款項，但限於開征申請人、開證行、和其他利害關系人。但是申請中止附加了很多限制條件，如未進行付款、未承兌、未保兌、未議付。同時需要法院有管轄權，申請人提供確切的證據，情況緊急，不中止將會造成重大損害，申請人提供可靠、充分的擔保。如有疑問可具體詢問
D. 國際經濟法案例分析
1. 是違約抄，因為交貨期是合同要件，超過合同約定的日期裝船顯然是違約；
2. 進口商可使用信用證，規定最遲裝船日期，如果出口人未能按時裝運，他就拿不到符合信用證要求的提單（B/L)，單證不符，銀行可以拒付，出口人得不到貨款。當然，如果偽造提單騙銀行付款那是另外一回事了。
E. 國際經濟法的一個案例
1、中國國際經濟來貿易仲裁委源員會有權受理此案，因為根據《聯合國國際貨物銷售合同公約》的規定，合同雙方當事人有權約定爭議處理的方式，所以只要雙方協商一致就可以選擇中國國際經濟貿易仲裁委員會處理。
2、 銀行不應該追回已付貨款，因為銀行的職責只負責審查信用證單證相符，單單相符的義務，所以銀行不對信用證真實情況負責，也就無需追回貨款。
3、 甲公司無權向銀行拒付貨款，因為信用證和合同相互獨立，根據信用證獨立原則，甲公司無權拒付貨款。
4、 乙公司抗辯不成立，根據《聯合國國際貨物銷售合同公約》的規定賣方應該對自己履行合同義務承擔質量擔保義務，乙公司根據商檢書並不意味著乙公司不對合同貨物質量負責。
5、 如果貨物在運輸途中遭遇風險而損失，此種風險應該由買方，也就是我國的甲公司承擔，因為CIF術語是「成本加運費加保險費」，風險自裝運港越過船舷時轉移，所以風險應該由甲公司承擔。
F. 國際經濟法案例分析
合同成立來
本案涉及到自逾期承諾的問題。
根據CISG第21條第2款規定，如果載有逾期承諾的信件或其它書面文件表明，依照它寄發時的情況，只要遞送正常，它本應是能夠及時送達要約人的，則此項逾期承諾應認為具有承諾的效力，除非要約人毫不遲延地用口頭或書面通知受要約人，他認為他的要約因逾期而失效。
本案中，B公司承諾到達遲延是由於郵局傳遞失誤（依照它寄發時的情況，只要遞送正常，它本應是能夠及時送達要約人）而且A公司未對B公司的回復毫不延遲的拒絕，故而該逾期承諾有效，合同成立。
G. 國際經濟法英文案例及翻譯 跪求
案例一：
TSAKIROGLOU & CO. LTD. V NOBLEE THORL G. m. b. H.House of Lords
[1962] A. C. 93
事實：
THE FACTS:
By a contract dated Hamburg, October 4, 1956 between Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd, of Khartoum as sellers, and the respondents, Noblee Thorl G. m. b. H. of Hamburg/Hargurg as buyers, through agents, the sellers agreed to sell and the buyers to buy about 300 tons of Sudanese groundnuts in the shell basis 3 percent, admixture new crop 1956/1957 at $50 per 1,000 kilos including bags c.i.f. Hamburg. Shipment November/December, 1956, with payment cash against documents on first presentation for 95 percent of the amount of provisional invoice, balance to be paid after the analysis on final invoice. The contract form was to be the incorporated Oil Seed Association Contract No.38(hereinafter called 「I.O.S.A Contract No. 38」) with arbitration in London. Clause 1 of I.O.S.A Contract No. 38 provided for 「shipment from an East African port…by steamers(tankers excluded) direct or indirect with or without transshipment.」
Both parties contracted on the basis that the goods would be shipped from Port Sudan. Clause 6 of the contract provided: 「in case of prohibition of import or export, blockade or war, and in all cases of force majeure preventing the shipment within the time fixed, or the delivery, the period allowed by not exceeding two months. After that, if the case of force majeure be still operating, the contract shall be cancled.」
At the date when the contract was made, both partied contemplated that shipment would be made via the Suez Canal. On October 29, 1956, the Israelis invaded Egypt, on November 1 Britain and France commenced military operations, and on November 2 the Suez Canal was blocked to shipping. At the date when the contract entered into, the usual and normal routes for the shipment of Sudanese groundnuts from Port Sudan to Hamburg was via the Suez Canal. However, the closure of the Suez Canal prevented transport from Port Sudan to Hamburg via the Canal and the impossibility by that route continued until April 1957. The distance via the Suez Canal is approximately 4,386 miles and the distance via the Cape of Good Hope is approximately 11,137 miles. From November 10, 1956, after the closure of the Canal, a 25% freight surcharge was placed on goods shipped on vessels proceeding via the Cape of Good Hope and this was increased to 100% on December 13, 1956.
The seller』s claim that the contract was frustrated and was at an end because of the closure of the Suez Canal was not accepted by the buyers.
法院程序：
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT
In arbitration proceedings, the umpire, by an award dated February 20, 1957, awarded that the sellers were in default and should pay to the buyers as the damages the sum of $5,625 together with $79 15s. costs of the award. The sellers were dissatisfied with the award, and a board of appeal appointed to hear the appeal on January 28, 1958, dismissed the appeal and upheld the umpire』s award.
判決：
JURISDICTION
The board of appeal』s award was in following term: 「so far as it is a question of fact we find and as far as it is a question of law we hold:
(i) These were hostilities but not war in Egypt at the material time.
(ii) Neither war nor force majeur prevented the shipment of the contract goods in the contract period to the contract destination, since shipment via the cape was not so prevented when the shipment via the Suez Canal was prevented by reason of force majeur.
(iii) It was not an implied term of the contract that shipment or transportation should be made via the Suez Canal and shipping the goods on a vessel via the Cape of Good Hope was not commercially and fundamentally different from shipping the goods on a vessel via the Suez Canal. So, the contract was not frustrated by the closure of Suez Canal.」
分析問題：
MERITS: Is there an implied term that the goods shall be carried by a particular rout? Is the contract frustrated?
(a) usual and customary route
The contention that the shipment of goods must be via Suez can only prevail if a term is implied, for the contract dose not say so. For the general proposition that in a c.i.f. contract the obligation, in the absence of express terms, is to follow the usual or customary route. It is not the date of the contract but the time of performance that determines what is customary. As the section 32(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, provides that: 「unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the seller must make such contract with the carrier on behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable having regarded to the nature of the goods and the other circumstances of the case.」 Therefore, if there is no customary route, that route must be chosen which is reasonable. If there is only one route, that must be taken if it is practicable. At the date when the performance was called for, there was no usual or customary route because the Suez Canal was closed and the only practicable route was via the Cape of Good Hope. The sellers could have fulfilled their obligation by a bill of lading via the Cape.
(b) whether the contract was frustrated by the closure of Suez？
The board should consider whether the imposition upon the sellers the obligation to ship by an emergence route via the Cape would be to impose upon them a fundamentally different obligation which neither party could at the time when the contract was performed have dreamed that the sellers would be required to perform. The board found no justification for the positive answer. A c.i.f. contract is for the sale of goods, not a contract of affreightment. The primary ty on the part of sellers was to dispatch the groundnuts by sea from one port to destination of the other. There was no evidence that the buyers attached any importance to the route. They were content that the nuts should be shipped at any date in November or December. There was no stipulated date for arrival at Hamburg. There was no evidence either, that the nuts would deteriorate or the transportation would involve special packing or stowing as a result of a longer voyage, nor any evidence that the market was seasonable. In a word, there was no evidence that the buyers cared by what route, or within seasonable limits, when the nuts arrived.
What, then, of the sellers? Clearly the contract of affreightment will be different and so may be the terms of insurance. In both these respects the sellers may be put to greater cost: their profit may be reced or even disappear. But an increase of expense is not a ground of frustration, the doctrine of frustration must be applied within very narrow limits, and this case falls far short of satisfying the necessary conditions. With all these facts before them, the board of appeal made their finding that performance by shipping on the Cape route was not commercially or fundamentally different from shipping via the Suez Canal, and the appeal should be dismissed.
TSAKIROGLOU和股份有限公司。有限公司。V . NOBLEE THORL m . b。H。上議院
亞特蘭大93][1962年
事實:
事實:
日期由一個合同,1956年10月4日漢堡,Tsakiroglou &公司之間。有限公司是作為賣方,和對喀土穆的受訪者,Noblee Thorl g . m . b。h .漢堡/ Hargurg通過代理人進行的,因為買方,賣方同意出售,買方購買約300噸花生殼的基礎上在蘇丹3%,新作物1956/1957摻合料在50美元每1000公斤包括塑料袋的cif價格。漢堡。1956年11、12、裝運,以付款交單方式付款先介紹為95%的數量的臨時發票後再付款,平衡分析最終的發票。合同的形式也要被合並的石油合同出版社,種子協會(以下簡稱「三八」號合同,我們已將I.O.S.A)與仲裁在倫敦。合同第一條規定的I.O.S.A 38號規定的「裝運港…從一個非洲東部由輪船(加油機除外)直接或間接的或有或無轉船。」
雙方的合同的基礎上從港口裝運的貨物將蘇丹。第6條合同提供的:"如果發生禁止進出口,封鎖或戰爭,在任何情況下都不可抗力防止固定的時間內裝船,或交貨、時期所允許不超過兩個月。在這之後,如果不可抗力的情況下還是操作,本合同應取消了。」
當合同之日起,兩partied沉思,貨物會經蘇伊士運河。1956年10月29日,以色列入侵埃及,11月1日,英國和法國開始軍事行動,並將於11月2日蘇伊士運河航運堵住了。當合同之日起進入,常規的和正常的路線的裝運港蘇丹從蘇丹落花生去漢堡是經過蘇伊士運河。然而,關閉蘇伊士運河運輸從港口阻止蘇丹運往漢堡,通過運河與不可能通過這條路線一直持續到四月1957年。通過蘇伊士運河的距離大約是通過4,386英里的路程,距離好望角是大約11,137英里。從11月10日,1956年關閉後,運河裡,有25%的貨運附加費是放在通過血管進行貨物的好望角和這是增加到100% 1956年12月13日。
賣方的要求正當,宣布該合同不灰心、到了末日,因為蘇伊士運河的關閉由買方不被接受。
法院程序:
程序之前,法庭
在仲裁程序中,裁判裁決日期,2月20日,1957年,授予,賣方違約,應在買方支付美元的損害5,625的總和15s.連同79美元的成本獎。賣方不滿的獎勵,聽到中的上訴委員會任命上訴1月28日,1958年,解散了上訴,維持裁判員的裁決。
判決:
管轄權
中的上訴委員會的裁決是在以下條件:「到目前為止,因為它是一個事實問題,我們發現,只要是一個問題的法律,我們持有:
(我)這些人都是在埃及敵對行動而不是戰爭在材料的時候。
(二)並且戰爭還是不可抗力阻止了一批合同貨物與合同的合同期限裝運目的地,因為通過好望角時也不那麼預防經蘇伊士運河裝運的原因是預防不可抗力。
(3)這不是一項默示合同期內的那批貨的裝運或交通應經蘇伊士運河和運輸貨物的船隻通過好望角不是商業和根本不同的船隻裝運此貨通過蘇伊士運河。所以,合同都沒有挫傷的關閉蘇伊士運河。」
分析問題:
優點:有一項默示的術語,它的貨物,應當由被某個特定的潰敗嗎?是合同煩躁嗎?
(一)常規和習慣航線
爭論貨物的裝船必須經蘇伊士運河只能流行如果一個學期的合同是暗示的,不這么說。在為廣大主張合同義務的到岸價格,在缺乏明示條款,是遵循通常和習慣的路線。它不是合同簽訂之日起,不過時間的表現,決定什麼是慣例。作為部分32(2)的商品銷售的行為,1893年,規定:「除非其他授權由買方、賣方必須做出這樣的合同與載體代表買方合理有認為商品的性質和其他情況下的案子。」因此,如果沒有習慣航線,這條路線的一定要選哪是合理的。如果只有一位路線,必須採取措施,如果它是可行的。在約會當表現是呼籲,沒有普通或者習慣航線,因為蘇伊士運河被關閉和唯一可行的路線是經過好望角。賣方可以履行他們的義務由提單通過的斗篷。
(b)是否該合同是沮喪的封蘇伊士運河嗎?
董事會應該考慮是否在賣方的稅款的義務,由一個出現船通過好望角路線會強加在他們身上是一個從根本上完全不同的義務,任何一方可以在海上保險合同進行的想像中,賣方將被要求完成。董事會發現沒有理由積極的回答。合同是到岸價格銷售的商品,而不是一個運輸合同中的。對部分的基本義務的銷售商是派遣落花生海運從一港運至目的地。沒有證據表明買方的任何重要附路線。他們是內容應該被清理的堅果在任何日期在11月或12月。沒有規定的日期為到達漢堡。不是的,是沒有證據的堅果會退化或交通將涉及到特殊包裝或害羞,結果較長的旅程,也沒有任何證據顯示市場得到了及時。總之,沒有證據表明買方關心哪條路線,或在被限制,當螺母及時到達。
那麼,什麼賣方索賠嗎?運輸合同中的清楚的將是不同的,因此可能是整個的保險待遇。在這兩個方面的賣方可能把利潤更大的成本:他們可能會減少甚至消失。但增加的費用支出不是地沮喪,沮喪的教義必須應用在非常狹窄的范圍,而本案異常不夠滿足的必要條件。他們與所有這些事實之前,董事會的求援:他們發現,在開普敦性能由船公司沒有商業路線或從根本上不同於船舶經蘇伊士運河,上訴應該被開除。
H. 國際經濟法案例分析
1. 有效
2. 有效
3. 成立
因為要約的要件（價格、數量等）完整，買方對有效要約的完全接受的承諾在有效期內，因此合同成立。
I. 國際經濟法案例 急！
1、稅務機關對A公司下屬B辦事處具有稅收管轄權
依據：所得來源地稅收管轄權——征稅國基於作為課稅對象的所得或財產系來源於或存在於本國境內的事實而主張行使的征稅權。
2、B辦事處乃A公司的分支機構（可視為分公司），不具有獨立法人資格，但是仍然應該在中國納稅。
依據：跨國營業所得征稅權、沖突及協調基本原則——「常設機構」原則（permanent establishment）
常設機構：一個企業進行其全部或部分生產，經營的固定場所，是外國法人在收入來源國境內設立的，標准：①有一個營業場所②場所必須固選③外國法人通過這種場所從事的必須是營利性質的活動
可歸屬於常設的機構的利潤范圍的確定（2個原則）
①實際聯系原則（effective connected）:有實際聯系
②引力原則(force of attraction)：不考慮是否有實際聯系，只要屬於來源於本國境內的所得，均可合並入常設機構，作為常設機構的所得征稅
3、在本案爭議中，A公司實際性的所得稅分配情況如何——得看中國的稅務機關採取何種原則，同時要看中美之間有無有關避免國際重復征稅的雙邊稅收協定，以及雙邊稅收協定中如何劃分稅收管轄權的。根據不同的情況而不同，參見：
國際重復征稅：→法律上的重復征稅（international double taxation）
指2個或2個以上國家各自依其稅收管轄權按同一稅種對同一納稅人的同一征稅對象在同一征稅期間內同時征稅
避免方法：
1、運用沖突規范
①將某個征稅對象的征稅權完全劃歸一方，從而排除另一方的征稅權
②確定雙方的稅收管轄權誰優先行使
2、免稅制：（Method of exemption）
居住國對其居民納稅人來源於或存在於境外的並已向來源國納稅的那部分跨國所得，在一定條件下，允許從其應稅所得中扣除，免於征稅
A、全額免稅制（Full exemption）
應稅所得額中扣除其來源於國外並已向來源國交了稅的那部分所得，其餘額按余額運用的稅率征稅
B、累進免稅制（Exemption with progression）
應稅所得額中扣除其來源於國外並已向來源國交了稅的那部分所得,扣除後，在確定稅率時，仍將這部分所得考慮計算在內
3、稅收抵免制：（Foreign tax credit）
居住國允許本國居民納稅人在本國稅法規定的限度內，用已在來源國繳納的稅款抵免其應就世界范圍內所得向居住國繳納稅額的一部分