⑴ 國際經濟法中提單的分類
這是名詞解釋，答多了沒用。給你個我們國經老師給的概念，絕對准確無誤。《國際經濟法》中的提單是指，用以證明海上運輸合同的訂立和貨物已經由承運人接受或者裝船，以及承運人保證據以交付貨物的單據。
⑵ 如何記住國際經濟法中的貿易術語
首先，你要清楚貿易術語的排列標准。13個貿易術語共分為E、F、C、D四組，以賣方的義務遞增、買方的義務遞減的順序標准排列。
然後，你按這個順序標准好好理解下貿易術語，然後再有針對性的記憶。
再次，找些貿易案例強化理解。貿易術語主要是和運輸尤其是海運結合緊密。
最後，重點記憶常用的貿易術語。FOB、CIF、FCR。
⑶ 求國際經濟法案例！急！很急！
[案情]
1998年2月20日，我國甲公司向日本乙公司發出要約：願以每台400美元的價格按照CIF天津價格條件購買電冰箱3000台，總價值2000萬美元。1998年2月22日，日本乙公司接到我國甲公司發出的要約，2月23日，日本乙公司將3000台電冰箱交給日本環球貨運公司裝船運輸，但日本環球貨運公司發現其中有500台電冰箱包裝破損，准備簽發不清潔提單。但日本乙公司為從日本環球貨運公司處拿到清潔提單，在其簽發提單前，向日本環球貨運公司出具了承擔賠償責任的保函，承運人日本環球貨運公司遂給乙公司簽發了清潔提單。乙公司持清潔提單按信用證結匯，中國甲公司於1999年3月I日收到貨物，發現500台電冰箱有嚴重質量問題，於是向承運人日本環球貨運公司索賠。
[問題]
（1）承運人應否承擔責任？
（2）如果甲公司向乙公司索賠，你認為索賠能否成立？
[參考答案]
（1）承運人應當承擔責任。因為承運人和收貨人的關系依提單確定，清潔提單項下的貨物因包裝破損，說明損失是承運人沒有盡到良好的管貨義務造成的，說明了承運人沒有盡到合同項下的最低責任，承運人應當承擔賠償責任。
（2）甲公司直接向乙公司索賠不能成立。因為乙公司取得的是清潔提單，說明包裝破造成的貨損原因不在乙公司。
[解析]
承運人是否應承擔責任，取決於承運人和收貨人的法律關系。二者的關系由提單來確定。承運人簽發清潔提單，說明貨物表面狀況良好。根據《中華人民共和國海商法》（以下簡稱《海商法》），清潔提單是承運人已經按照提單所載狀況收到貨物或者貨物己裝船的初步證據；對於承運人向收貨人提出的與提單所載狀況不符的證據，不予承認。承運人有妥善、謹慎地保管貨物的義務。貨物和提單不符，承運人應當負責。
甲公司和乙公司的關系，依買賣合同確定。甲公司向乙公司索賠，必須證明乙公司沒有適當履行合同義務。但是根據清潔提單，可以從法律上推定包裝破損造成的貨損不是乙公司造成的，而是承運人造成的。因此，直接向乙公司索賠不能成立。甲公司應該向承運人索賠。
⑷ 司考國際經濟法：幾種主要貿易術語
FCA（貨交承運人）。該術語是適用最廣泛的一個貿易術語，可以適用於一切運輸方式。此外其交貨分兩種情況，賣方承擔不同的責任。
FOB（裝運港船上交貨）。FOB術語後標出的是裝運港的名稱。如FOB上海，表明該批貨物的裝運港是上海。
CIF和CFR.CIF是常用的一個貿易術語，與FOB不同，CIF術語後標明的是卸貨港的名稱，如CIF大連，表明該批貨物的卸貨港是大連。
CPT和CIP.CPT指賣方向其指定的承運人交貨，但賣方還必須支付將貨物運至目的地的運費。貨物的風險自貨物交給第一承運人時轉移。在法律特徵上CPT與CFR對應，不同的是CFR只適用於海運和內河航運，而CPT適用於各種運輸方式。
⑸ 一個國際經濟法問題:CIF中的運費問題.舉例說明一下.謝謝!
CIF價格術語是賣方承擔到目的港的運費和保險費——如果從大同運煤到日本，無論在哪個中國港口裝運，那麼，到目的港的一切運費（包括從大同到日本的港口）都由賣方承擔。
⑹ 國際經濟法問題：在海上貨物運輸中，托運人向承運人出具保函，保證貨物符合合同約定，若最終承運人向收貨
額…這兩個問題都要看投保的是什麼 是海牙規則 維斯比規則 還是漢堡規則。不同的頭保內容，對保函的保護程度不一樣。找保險公司就行 追償是保險公司的事
⑺ 國際經濟法的一道綜合題，求詳細答案吖！感激不盡！！！
簡單
1、航行過失，海牙規則下船方免責，平安險下保險也免責。
2、修回船費用，共同海損，均攤。答
3、60%貨物，船方承擔。
4、10%賣方或船方承擔，這里比較復雜，看船方是否開出的是清潔提單而承擔方會不同。
5、FCA和FOB一樣，只不過FCA是非水聯運，通常買方投保。
6、水漬險就可以得到賠償。
⑻ 國際經濟法中13個貿易術語運輸合同都是買方訂立么
當然不是。
買方負責安排主運輸的術語：EXW/FCA/FAS/FOB
賣方負責安排主運輸的術語：CFR/CIF/CPT/CIP/DAF/DES/DEQ/DDU/DDP
誰安排運輸，誰回訂立運輸合答同。
簡單來說，就是E組/F組是買方負責安排主運輸，C組/D組是賣方負責主運輸。
⑼ 關於國際經濟法的一道案例題
（1）有理，應支付。（2）可以，只要有明確的受約束的意思表示即可。
「天不想亮」你懂不懂啊？這是英國法判例上大名鼎鼎的薰劑案！
Carlill Vs. Carbolic smoke ball
The Full decision of the case
APPEAL from a decision of Hawkins, J.(2)
The defendants, who were the proprietors and vendors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball," inserted in the Pall Mall Gazette of November 13, 1891, and in other newspapers, the following advertisement: "100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. 1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.
"During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.
"One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10, post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5 Address, Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London."
The plaintiff, a lady, on the faith of this advertisement, bought one of the balls at a chemist』s, and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. Hawkins, J., held that she was entitled to recover the 100 The defendants appealed.
Finlay, Q.C., and T. Terrell, for the defendants. The facts shew that there was no binding contract between the parties. The case is not like Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. Ad. 621), where the money was to become payable on the performance of certain acts by the plaintiff; here the plaintiff could not by any act of her own establish a claim, for, to establish her right to the money, it was necessary that she should be attacked by influenza - an event over which she had no control. The words express an intention, but do not amount to a promise: Week v. Tibold. 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.). The present case is similar to Harris v. Nickerson. Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 286. The advertisement is too vague to be the basis of a contract; there is no limit as to time, and no means of checking the use of the ball. Anyone who had influenza might come forward and depose that he had used the ball for a fortnight, and it would be impossible to disprove it. Guthing v. Lynn 2 B. Ad. 232 supports the view that the terms are too vague to make a contract, there being no limit as to time, a person might claim who took the influenza ten years after using the remedy. There is no consideration moving from the plaintiff: Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476. The present case differs from Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860, for there an overt act was done by the plaintiff on the faith of a statement by the defendants. In order to make a contract by fulfilment of a condition, there must either be a communication of intention to accept the offer, or there must be the performance of some overt act. The mere doing an act in private will not be enough. This principle was laid down by Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. The terms of the advertisement would enable a person who stole the balls to claim the reward, though his using them was no possible benefit to the defendants. At all events, the advertisement should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants. But, if there be a contract at all, it is a wagering contract, as being one where the liability depends on an event beyond the control of the parties, and which is therefore void under 8 9 Vict. c. 109. Or, if not, it is bad under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as being a policy of insurance on the happening of an uncertain event, and not conforming with the provisions of that section.
Dickens, Q.C., and W. B. Allen, for the plaintiff. [THE COURT intimated that they required no argument as to the question whether the contract was a wager or a policy of insurance.] The advertisement clearly was an offer by the defendants; it was published that it might be read and acted on, and they cannot be heard to say that it was an empty boast, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. The offer was ly accepted. An advertisement was addressed to all the public - as soon as a person does the act mentioned, there is a contract with him. It is said that there must be a communication of the acceptance; but the language of Lord Blackburn, in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666, shews that merely doing the acts indicated is an acceptance of the proposal. It never was intended that a person proposing to use the smoke ball should go to the office and obtain a repetition of the statements in the advertisement. The defendants are endeavouring to introce words into the advertisement to the effect that the use of the preparation must be with their privity or under their superintendence. Where an offer is made to all the world, nothing can be imported beyond the fulfilment of the conditions. Notice before the event cannot be required; the advertisement is an offer made to any person who fulfils the condition, as is explained in Spencer v. Harding Law Rep. 5 C. P. 561. Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621 shews strongly that notice to the person making the offer is not necessary. The promise is to the person who does an act, not to the person who says he is going to do it and then does it. As to notice after the event, it could have no effect, and the present case is within the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. It is urged that the terms are too vague and uncertain to make a contract; but, as regards parties, there is no more uncertainty than in all other cases of this description. It is said, too, that the promise might apply to a person who stole any one of the balls. But it is clear that only a person who lawfully acquired the preparation could claim the benefit of the advertisement. It is also urged that the terms should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants; but that is not the import of the words, and there is no reason for implying such a limitation, an increased sale being a benefit to the defendants, though effected through a middleman, and the use of the balls must be presumed to serve as an advertisement and increase the sale. As to the want of restriction as to time, there are several possible constructions of the terms; they may mean that, after you have used it for a fortnight, you will be safe so long as you go on using it, or that you will be safe ring the prevalence of the epidemic. Or the true view may be that a fortnight』s use will make a person safe for a reasonable time.
Then as to the consideration. In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476, Lord Campbell never meant to say that if there was a direct invitation to take shares, and shares were taken on the faith of it, there was no consideration. The decision went on the form of the declaration, which did not state that the contract extended to future holders. The decision that there was no consideration was qualified by the words "as between these parties," the plaintiff not having alleged himself to be a member of the class to whom the promise was made.
Finlay, Q.C., in reply. There is no binding contract. The money is payable on a person』s taking influenza after having used the ball for a fortnight, and the language would apply just as well to a person who had used it for a fortnight before the advertisement as to a person who used it on the faith of the advertisement. The advertisement is merely an expression of intention to pay 100 to a person who fulfils two conditions; but it is not a request to do anything, and there is no more consideration in using the ball than in contracting the influenza. That a contract should be completed by a private act is against the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 692. The use of the ball at home stands on the same level as the writing a letter which is kept in the writer』s drawer. In Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860 the fact was ascertained by a public, not a secret act. The respondent relies on Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621, and the other cases of that class; but there a service was done to the advertiser. Here no service to the defendants was requested, for it was no benefit to them that the balls should be used: their interest was only that they should be sold. Those cases also differ from the present in this important particular, that in them the service was one which could only be performed by a limited number of persons, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining with whom the contract was made. It is said the advertisement was not a legal contract, but a promise in honour, which, if the defendants had been approached in a proper way, they would have fulfilled. A request is as necessary in the case of an executed consideration as of an executory one:
Lampleigh v. Braithwait 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. pp. 153, 157, 159; and here there was no request. Then as to the want of limitation as to time, it is conceded that the defendants cannot have meant to contract without some limit, and three limitations have been suggested. The limitation "ring the prevalence of the epidemic" is inadmissible, for the advertisement applies to colds as well as influenza. The limitation "ring use" is excluded by the language "after having used." The third is, "within a reasonable time," and that is probably what was intended; but it cannot be deced from the words; so the fair result is that there was no legal contract at all.
看不懂？我給你大致講一下。法官是這么說的，雖然說廣告是對不特定人提出的，一般情況下屬於要約邀請（ITT），但是本案中，被告不僅將懸賞內容寫得十分具體，而且已經把1000英鎊存進銀行，充分顯示出它願意受到該廣告內容的約束（to be bound）,所以符合了要約的根本特徵，即受約束的意思表示。所以，本案中的廣告是一個要約。而原告通過購買並使用薰劑的行為作出了行為承諾。有要約，有承諾，這個合同就成立了。
英美法教材用這個案例來說明，要約不一定要向特定人發出，只要有明確的受約束的意思表示即可。
⑽ 國際經濟法案例分析，尋求答案一 （專業，全面）
撤回是要約送達對方前或同時撤回通知抵達對方方可生效。 撤銷是必須在對方承諾前撤銷，當要約是不可撤銷的情況下，在有效期限內不可撤銷。 因此本案例中，A已趕在B收到要約前將撤回通知送達B處，因此，B在下午收到的要約無效。因此本案例中合同不成立。