A. 找人给翻译一个国际经济法的案例，关于CISG的，急用，十分感谢。
关于赔偿，Globex公司辩驳到，CISG第74条的合适的解读是赋予赔偿责任,作为遭受的特别标识违约的后果“可预见的损失......只是作为实际损失的上限。” 参见CISG条款74（“由一方造成的违约赔偿包括[赔偿退款种类] ...遭受对方的违约的后果。这样的赔偿不得超过该违约方可预见到的损失......在合同订立时“）。即使这种说法是正确的，而仲裁员错误地解释第74条款来完全判决为可预见的损失，我们的先例很清楚说明这种情况下，仲裁员并不是明显无视法律。见美林（Merril Lynch)，皮尔斯(Pierce)，芬纳和史密斯公司(Fenner & Smith, Inc.)诉Bobker，808卷，第930，933页（2D Cir.1986）（“ 显然的漠视法律的......明确地意味着不仅仅是对法律的错用或误解“（内部引号略））。华莱士，378 F.3d 在190页（“我们的案例表明，我们只在对法律准则最恶劣地错误使用的案例情况下，使用对法律条款的明确轻视去撤回仲裁员的裁决。”）。
我们已经考虑了Globex的其余争议并认为没有法律依据。
由于上述原因，地方法院的判决是肯定的。（这句你上面没有，我加上了，比较完整）
B. 什么地方可以找到国际经济法的英文案例
Woodtrans Navigation Corporation & SAN WAI Navigation S.A. Panama
I. Parties involved
Applicant: Woodtrans Navigation Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Woodtrans).
Applicant: Sanwai Navigation S.A Panama (hereinafter referred to as Sanwai)
Respondent: Angang Group International Trade Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Angang)
II. Main facts of the case
Angang signed a contract with Billion Golden Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Billion Golden) on Feb. 20th 1995 to sell Billion Golden hot rolling steel for 5,000 tons with FOB price for USD 295 per ton and payment by L/C. on June 30th of the same year, M.V. UNISON PRAISE owned by Woodtrans was loaded with the cargo under above contract at port of Dalian. When the cargo have been loaded on board, the carrier Merpati Lines S.A. (hereinafter referred to as Merpati) issued the original bill of lading in triplicate to Angang. The bill of lading states that: Shipper: Angang, Consignee: to order of PT Bank Bumi Daya (persero) Jakarta Rasuna Said Branch, Port of Loading: Dalian, Port of Destination: Jakarta, Weight of Cargo: 5155.520 ton. On July 21st, UNISON PRAISE arrived at the port of Jakarta, and then the carrier delivered the cargo to the Notify party listed in bill of lading without presentation of the same after the cargo was discharged from the vessel. Upon receipt of the shipped clean bill of lading issued by the carrier, Angang then submitted to the issuing bank through Anshan Branch of China the whole set of documents including original bill of lading, commercial invoice to settle the payment. The value of cargo as recorded by the invoice amounts to USD 1,520,878.4. Above documents are transferred to the issuing bank on July 8th and rejected by the issuing bank because of inconsistence with L/C. Angang received the returned bill of lading and the invoice on August 20th. Woodtrans is the registry owner of the carrying vessel UNISON PRAISE. M.V UNISON GREAT arrested by Dalian Maritime Court and owned by Woodtrans is the sister vessel of UNISON PRAISE. On April 16th 1996, Woodtrans sold UNISON GREAT to Sanwai who changed the name of vessel to SAN WAI. Through the statement from Panama Public Registry Authority, the owner of UNISON PRAISE did not logout the registry. As a result, the owner of this vessel is still Woodtrans.
III. The original judgment of the case
Dalian Maritime Court tried the case and decided that: Since the carrier Merpati issued the bill of lading and delivered the cargo to UNISON PRAISE to undertake the carriage, Woodtrans is in the legal position of actual carrier as provided by Maritime Code of P.R.C. The Bill of Lading is the evidence of contract of goods by sea, and the certificate for title and documents against which the carrier guarantee to deliver the cargo. When the shipper holds the bill of lading, the relationship of right and liability between the carrier and the holder shall be defined as the provisions of bill of lading. It is the legal responsibility of the carrier to deliver the cargo upon presentation of original bill of lading according to the law. According to Article 61 of Maritime Code, it is also the responsibility of the actual carrier to delivery the cargo against the surrendering of bill of lading. Under the time charter party, even the charterer is entitled to direct the master concerning the operation of vessel as provided by Article 136 of Maritime Code, the instruction made by the carrier in the name of the charterer to the master to deliver the cargo without presentation of bill of lading has not only exceed the legal right of the charterer but also violated the forcible obligation for the carrier and the actual carrier to delivery the cargo against the presentation of bill of lading. Woodtrans knew its forcible obligation to delivery the cargo against the presentation of bill of lading but still violated this obligation, which constitutes an illegal act done with intent and shall not be entitled to benefit from the exemption and the limitation of liability as provided by bill of lading and therefore shall take complete responsibility for the losses suffered by Angang. Meantime, Dalian Maritime Court also determined that the flag of SANWAI is Panama. When exercising the arrest of vessel, the identification of the ownership of SANWAI (original UNISON GREAT) shall apply the law of Panama in accordance with Article 270 of Maritime Code. According to Article 1083 and 1089 of Maritime Code of Panama, under any circumstances, the transference of vessel’ ownership would not act against the third party without registry at public authority. Although the buyer obtained the UNISON GREAT, Woodtrans did not register the transference of ownership at public registry authority at Panama when the vessel was arrested by Dalian Maritime Court. Therefore, the vessel still owned by Woodtrans when the court exercised arrest of the vessel. The objection raised by Sanwai with the court is the legal owner of the vessel shall not be sustained. Hence, the court made a judgment: Woodtrans shall compensate Angang for the loss of cargo in amount of RMB 12,700,000 and the interests thereto in rate of 10.98% per month counting from August 20th 1995 to the date the payment actually being paid; dismiss the claim filed by Sanwai who is in a position of owner in claiming for the incorrect arrest of vessel against Angang. Woodtrans and Sanwai refused to accept the judgment of first trial and filed an appeal with the Liaoning Higher People’s Court. The Liaoning Higher People’s Court heard the case and decided that: Angang is the legal holder of the bill of lading who, under the provision of Maritime Code and internal maritime practice, is entitled to claim for the losses of cargo against Woodtrans who delivered the cargo without presentation of bill of lading. Although Woodtrans entered into a time charter party with Merpati, the act of delivery of cargo without presentation of bill of lading was done by UNISON PRAISE ring the performance of time charter party and Woodtrans therefore could not be exempted from the legalized liability. Since UNISON PRAISE carried the cargo under the bill of lading, Woodtrans as the owner of the vessel has acted as the actual carrier under Maritime Code. It is the responsibility not only of the carrier but also the actual carrier to deliver the cargo to the holders who surrender the original bill of lading. Without presentation of original bill of lading, the cargo was delivered to the Notify Party recorded in bill of lading and all the losses suffered by Angang shall be compensated fully by the liability party. UNISON PRAISE owned by Woodtrans shall oblige herself according to the law of China and international maritime practice. Her obeying of the instruction of carrier in delivering of cargo without presentation of bill of lading did not satisfy the condition for exemption, although she enjoyed the right to recourse the losses thereto against the instructor. Therefore the reason for appeal of Woodtrans shall not be supported by the Higher People’s Court. The appeal filed by Sanwai is concerned with objection to the arrest of the vessel before instating an action and is lack of basis for facts and laws because the facts was ascertained at the original proceres for preservation. The appeal has not interested relationship with the concerned disputes of delivery of cargo without presentation of bill of lading and is not provided with the independent claim as required by the law. This appeal is overruled by the court. In the end, Liaoning Higher People’s Court rejected the appeal and affirmed the original judgment.
IV. How is the leading case made:
C. 国际经济法案例
你可以申请有管复辖权的法院中制止支付信用证项下的款项，但限于开征申请人、开证行、和其他利害关系人。但是申请中止附加了很多限制条件，如未进行付款、未承兑、未保兑、未议付。同时需要法院有管辖权，申请人提供确切的证据，情况紧急，不中止将会造成重大损害，申请人提供可靠、充分的担保。如有疑问可具体询问
D. 国际经济法案例分析
1. 是违约抄，因为交货期是合同要件，超过合同约定的日期装船显然是违约；
2. 进口商可使用信用证，规定最迟装船日期，如果出口人未能按时装运，他就拿不到符合信用证要求的提单（B/L)，单证不符，银行可以拒付，出口人得不到货款。当然，如果伪造提单骗银行付款那是另外一回事了。
E. 国际经济法的一个案例
1、中国国际经济来贸易仲裁委源员会有权受理此案，因为根据《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》的规定，合同双方当事人有权约定争议处理的方式，所以只要双方协商一致就可以选择中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会处理。
2、 银行不应该追回已付货款，因为银行的职责只负责审查信用证单证相符，单单相符的义务，所以银行不对信用证真实情况负责，也就无需追回货款。
3、 甲公司无权向银行拒付货款，因为信用证和合同相互独立，根据信用证独立原则，甲公司无权拒付货款。
4、 乙公司抗辩不成立，根据《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》的规定卖方应该对自己履行合同义务承担质量担保义务，乙公司根据商检书并不意味着乙公司不对合同货物质量负责。
5、 如果货物在运输途中遭遇风险而损失，此种风险应该由买方，也就是我国的甲公司承担，因为CIF术语是“成本加运费加保险费”，风险自装运港越过船舷时转移，所以风险应该由甲公司承担。
F. 国际经济法案例分析
合同成立来
本案涉及到自逾期承诺的问题。
根据CISG第21条第2款规定，如果载有逾期承诺的信件或其它书面文件表明，依照它寄发时的情况，只要递送正常，它本应是能够及时送达要约人的，则此项逾期承诺应认为具有承诺的效力，除非要约人毫不迟延地用口头或书面通知受要约人，他认为他的要约因逾期而失效。
本案中，B公司承诺到达迟延是由于邮局传递失误（依照它寄发时的情况，只要递送正常，它本应是能够及时送达要约人）而且A公司未对B公司的回复毫不延迟的拒绝，故而该逾期承诺有效，合同成立。
G. 国际经济法英文案例及翻译 跪求
案例一：
TSAKIROGLOU & CO. LTD. V NOBLEE THORL G. m. b. H.House of Lords
[1962] A. C. 93
事实：
THE FACTS:
By a contract dated Hamburg, October 4, 1956 between Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd, of Khartoum as sellers, and the respondents, Noblee Thorl G. m. b. H. of Hamburg/Hargurg as buyers, through agents, the sellers agreed to sell and the buyers to buy about 300 tons of Sudanese groundnuts in the shell basis 3 percent, admixture new crop 1956/1957 at $50 per 1,000 kilos including bags c.i.f. Hamburg. Shipment November/December, 1956, with payment cash against documents on first presentation for 95 percent of the amount of provisional invoice, balance to be paid after the analysis on final invoice. The contract form was to be the incorporated Oil Seed Association Contract No.38(hereinafter called “I.O.S.A Contract No. 38”) with arbitration in London. Clause 1 of I.O.S.A Contract No. 38 provided for “shipment from an East African port…by steamers(tankers excluded) direct or indirect with or without transshipment.”
Both parties contracted on the basis that the goods would be shipped from Port Sudan. Clause 6 of the contract provided: “in case of prohibition of import or export, blockade or war, and in all cases of force majeure preventing the shipment within the time fixed, or the delivery, the period allowed by not exceeding two months. After that, if the case of force majeure be still operating, the contract shall be cancled.”
At the date when the contract was made, both partied contemplated that shipment would be made via the Suez Canal. On October 29, 1956, the Israelis invaded Egypt, on November 1 Britain and France commenced military operations, and on November 2 the Suez Canal was blocked to shipping. At the date when the contract entered into, the usual and normal routes for the shipment of Sudanese groundnuts from Port Sudan to Hamburg was via the Suez Canal. However, the closure of the Suez Canal prevented transport from Port Sudan to Hamburg via the Canal and the impossibility by that route continued until April 1957. The distance via the Suez Canal is approximately 4,386 miles and the distance via the Cape of Good Hope is approximately 11,137 miles. From November 10, 1956, after the closure of the Canal, a 25% freight surcharge was placed on goods shipped on vessels proceeding via the Cape of Good Hope and this was increased to 100% on December 13, 1956.
The seller’s claim that the contract was frustrated and was at an end because of the closure of the Suez Canal was not accepted by the buyers.
法院程序：
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT
In arbitration proceedings, the umpire, by an award dated February 20, 1957, awarded that the sellers were in default and should pay to the buyers as the damages the sum of $5,625 together with $79 15s. costs of the award. The sellers were dissatisfied with the award, and a board of appeal appointed to hear the appeal on January 28, 1958, dismissed the appeal and upheld the umpire’s award.
判决：
JURISDICTION
The board of appeal’s award was in following term: “so far as it is a question of fact we find and as far as it is a question of law we hold:
(i) These were hostilities but not war in Egypt at the material time.
(ii) Neither war nor force majeur prevented the shipment of the contract goods in the contract period to the contract destination, since shipment via the cape was not so prevented when the shipment via the Suez Canal was prevented by reason of force majeur.
(iii) It was not an implied term of the contract that shipment or transportation should be made via the Suez Canal and shipping the goods on a vessel via the Cape of Good Hope was not commercially and fundamentally different from shipping the goods on a vessel via the Suez Canal. So, the contract was not frustrated by the closure of Suez Canal.”
分析问题：
MERITS: Is there an implied term that the goods shall be carried by a particular rout? Is the contract frustrated?
(a) usual and customary route
The contention that the shipment of goods must be via Suez can only prevail if a term is implied, for the contract dose not say so. For the general proposition that in a c.i.f. contract the obligation, in the absence of express terms, is to follow the usual or customary route. It is not the date of the contract but the time of performance that determines what is customary. As the section 32(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, provides that: “unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the seller must make such contract with the carrier on behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable having regarded to the nature of the goods and the other circumstances of the case.” Therefore, if there is no customary route, that route must be chosen which is reasonable. If there is only one route, that must be taken if it is practicable. At the date when the performance was called for, there was no usual or customary route because the Suez Canal was closed and the only practicable route was via the Cape of Good Hope. The sellers could have fulfilled their obligation by a bill of lading via the Cape.
(b) whether the contract was frustrated by the closure of Suez？
The board should consider whether the imposition upon the sellers the obligation to ship by an emergence route via the Cape would be to impose upon them a fundamentally different obligation which neither party could at the time when the contract was performed have dreamed that the sellers would be required to perform. The board found no justification for the positive answer. A c.i.f. contract is for the sale of goods, not a contract of affreightment. The primary ty on the part of sellers was to dispatch the groundnuts by sea from one port to destination of the other. There was no evidence that the buyers attached any importance to the route. They were content that the nuts should be shipped at any date in November or December. There was no stipulated date for arrival at Hamburg. There was no evidence either, that the nuts would deteriorate or the transportation would involve special packing or stowing as a result of a longer voyage, nor any evidence that the market was seasonable. In a word, there was no evidence that the buyers cared by what route, or within seasonable limits, when the nuts arrived.
What, then, of the sellers? Clearly the contract of affreightment will be different and so may be the terms of insurance. In both these respects the sellers may be put to greater cost: their profit may be reced or even disappear. But an increase of expense is not a ground of frustration, the doctrine of frustration must be applied within very narrow limits, and this case falls far short of satisfying the necessary conditions. With all these facts before them, the board of appeal made their finding that performance by shipping on the Cape route was not commercially or fundamentally different from shipping via the Suez Canal, and the appeal should be dismissed.
TSAKIROGLOU和股份有限公司。有限公司。V . NOBLEE THORL m . b。H。上议院
亚特兰大93][1962年
事实:
事实:
日期由一个合同,1956年10月4日汉堡,Tsakiroglou &公司之间。有限公司是作为卖方,和对喀土穆的受访者,Noblee Thorl g . m . b。h .汉堡/ Hargurg通过代理人进行的,因为买方,卖方同意出售,买方购买约300吨花生壳的基础上在苏丹3%,新作物1956/1957掺合料在50美元每1000公斤包括塑料袋的cif价格。汉堡。1956年11、12、装运,以付款交单方式付款先介绍为95%的数量的临时发票后再付款,平衡分析最终的发票。合同的形式也要被合并的石油合同出版社,种子协会(以下简称“三八”号合同,我们已将I.O.S.A)与仲裁在伦敦。合同第一条规定的I.O.S.A 38号规定的“装运港…从一个非洲东部由轮船(加油机除外)直接或间接的或有或无转船。”
双方的合同的基础上从港口装运的货物将苏丹。第6条合同提供的:"如果发生禁止进出口,封锁或战争,在任何情况下都不可抗力防止固定的时间内装船,或交货、时期所允许不超过两个月。在这之后,如果不可抗力的情况下还是操作,本合同应取消了。”
当合同之日起,两partied沉思,货物会经苏伊士运河。1956年10月29日,以色列入侵埃及,11月1日,英国和法国开始军事行动,并将于11月2日苏伊士运河航运堵住了。当合同之日起进入,常规的和正常的路线的装运港苏丹从苏丹落花生去汉堡是经过苏伊士运河。然而,关闭苏伊士运河运输从港口阻止苏丹运往汉堡,通过运河与不可能通过这条路线一直持续到四月1957年。通过苏伊士运河的距离大约是通过4,386英里的路程,距离好望角是大约11,137英里。从11月10日,1956年关闭后,运河里,有25%的货运附加费是放在通过血管进行货物的好望角和这是增加到100% 1956年12月13日。
卖方的要求正当,宣布该合同不灰心、到了末日,因为苏伊士运河的关闭由买方不被接受。
法院程序:
程序之前,法庭
在仲裁程序中,裁判裁决日期,2月20日,1957年,授予,卖方违约,应在买方支付美元的损害5,625的总和15s.连同79美元的成本奖。卖方不满的奖励,听到中的上诉委员会任命上诉1月28日,1958年,解散了上诉,维持裁判员的裁决。
判决:
管辖权
中的上诉委员会的裁决是在以下条件:“到目前为止,因为它是一个事实问题,我们发现,只要是一个问题的法律,我们持有:
(我)这些人都是在埃及敌对行动而不是战争在材料的时候。
(二)并且战争还是不可抗力阻止了一批合同货物与合同的合同期限装运目的地,因为通过好望角时也不那么预防经苏伊士运河装运的原因是预防不可抗力。
(3)这不是一项默示合同期内的那批货的装运或交通应经苏伊士运河和运输货物的船只通过好望角不是商业和根本不同的船只装运此货通过苏伊士运河。所以,合同都没有挫伤的关闭苏伊士运河。”
分析问题:
优点:有一项默示的术语,它的货物,应当由被某个特定的溃败吗?是合同烦躁吗?
(一)常规和习惯航线
争论货物的装船必须经苏伊士运河只能流行如果一个学期的合同是暗示的,不这么说。在为广大主张合同义务的到岸价格,在缺乏明示条款,是遵循通常和习惯的路线。它不是合同签订之日起,不过时间的表现,决定什么是惯例。作为部分32(2)的商品销售的行为,1893年,规定:“除非其他授权由买方、卖方必须做出这样的合同与载体代表买方合理有认为商品的性质和其他情况下的案子。”因此,如果没有习惯航线,这条路线的一定要选哪是合理的。如果只有一位路线,必须采取措施,如果它是可行的。在约会当表现是呼吁,没有普通或者习惯航线,因为苏伊士运河被关闭和唯一可行的路线是经过好望角。卖方可以履行他们的义务由提单通过的斗篷。
(b)是否该合同是沮丧的封苏伊士运河吗?
董事会应该考虑是否在卖方的税款的义务,由一个出现船通过好望角路线会强加在他们身上是一个从根本上完全不同的义务,任何一方可以在海上保险合同进行的想象中,卖方将被要求完成。董事会发现没有理由积极的回答。合同是到岸价格销售的商品,而不是一个运输合同中的。对部分的基本义务的销售商是派遣落花生海运从一港运至目的地。没有证据表明买方的任何重要附路线。他们是内容应该被清理的坚果在任何日期在11月或12月。没有规定的日期为到达汉堡。不是的,是没有证据的坚果会退化或交通将涉及到特殊包装或害羞,结果较长的旅程,也没有任何证据显示市场得到了及时。总之,没有证据表明买方关心哪条路线,或在被限制,当螺母及时到达。
那么,什么卖方索赔吗?运输合同中的清楚的将是不同的,因此可能是整个的保险待遇。在这两个方面的卖方可能把利润更大的成本:他们可能会减少甚至消失。但增加的费用支出不是地沮丧,沮丧的教义必须应用在非常狭窄的范围,而本案异常不够满足的必要条件。他们与所有这些事实之前,董事会的求援:他们发现,在开普敦性能由船公司没有商业路线或从根本上不同于船舶经苏伊士运河,上诉应该被开除。
H. 国际经济法案例分析
1. 有效
2. 有效
3. 成立
因为要约的要件（价格、数量等）完整，买方对有效要约的完全接受的承诺在有效期内，因此合同成立。
I. 国际经济法案例 急！
1、税务机关对A公司下属B办事处具有税收管辖权
依据：所得来源地税收管辖权——征税国基于作为课税对象的所得或财产系来源于或存在于本国境内的事实而主张行使的征税权。
2、B办事处乃A公司的分支机构（可视为分公司），不具有独立法人资格，但是仍然应该在中国纳税。
依据：跨国营业所得征税权、冲突及协调基本原则——“常设机构”原则（permanent establishment）
常设机构：一个企业进行其全部或部分生产，经营的固定场所，是外国法人在收入来源国境内设立的，标准：①有一个营业场所②场所必须固选③外国法人通过这种场所从事的必须是营利性质的活动
可归属于常设的机构的利润范围的确定（2个原则）
①实际联系原则（effective connected）:有实际联系
②引力原则(force of attraction)：不考虑是否有实际联系，只要属于来源于本国境内的所得，均可合并入常设机构，作为常设机构的所得征税
3、在本案争议中，A公司实际性的所得税分配情况如何——得看中国的税务机关采取何种原则，同时要看中美之间有无有关避免国际重复征税的双边税收协定，以及双边税收协定中如何划分税收管辖权的。根据不同的情况而不同，参见：
国际重复征税：→法律上的重复征税（international double taxation）
指2个或2个以上国家各自依其税收管辖权按同一税种对同一纳税人的同一征税对象在同一征税期间内同时征税
避免方法：
1、运用冲突规范
①将某个征税对象的征税权完全划归一方，从而排除另一方的征税权
②确定双方的税收管辖权谁优先行使
2、免税制：（Method of exemption）
居住国对其居民纳税人来源于或存在于境外的并已向来源国纳税的那部分跨国所得，在一定条件下，允许从其应税所得中扣除，免于征税
A、全额免税制（Full exemption）
应税所得额中扣除其来源于国外并已向来源国交了税的那部分所得，其余额按余额运用的税率征税
B、累进免税制（Exemption with progression）
应税所得额中扣除其来源于国外并已向来源国交了税的那部分所得,扣除后，在确定税率时，仍将这部分所得考虑计算在内
3、税收抵免制：（Foreign tax credit）
居住国允许本国居民纳税人在本国税法规定的限度内，用已在来源国缴纳的税款抵免其应就世界范围内所得向居住国缴纳税额的一部分