⑴ 国际经济法中提单的分类
这是名词解释，答多了没用。给你个我们国经老师给的概念，绝对准确无误。《国际经济法》中的提单是指，用以证明海上运输合同的订立和货物已经由承运人接受或者装船，以及承运人保证据以交付货物的单据。
⑵ 如何记住国际经济法中的贸易术语
首先，你要清楚贸易术语的排列标准。13个贸易术语共分为E、F、C、D四组，以卖方的义务递增、买方的义务递减的顺序标准排列。
然后，你按这个顺序标准好好理解下贸易术语，然后再有针对性的记忆。
再次，找些贸易案例强化理解。贸易术语主要是和运输尤其是海运结合紧密。
最后，重点记忆常用的贸易术语。FOB、CIF、FCR。
⑶ 求国际经济法案例！急！很急！
[案情]
1998年2月20日，我国甲公司向日本乙公司发出要约：愿以每台400美元的价格按照CIF天津价格条件购买电冰箱3000台，总价值2000万美元。1998年2月22日，日本乙公司接到我国甲公司发出的要约，2月23日，日本乙公司将3000台电冰箱交给日本环球货运公司装船运输，但日本环球货运公司发现其中有500台电冰箱包装破损，准备签发不清洁提单。但日本乙公司为从日本环球货运公司处拿到清洁提单，在其签发提单前，向日本环球货运公司出具了承担赔偿责任的保函，承运人日本环球货运公司遂给乙公司签发了清洁提单。乙公司持清洁提单按信用证结汇，中国甲公司于1999年3月I日收到货物，发现500台电冰箱有严重质量问题，于是向承运人日本环球货运公司索赔。
[问题]
（1）承运人应否承担责任？
（2）如果甲公司向乙公司索赔，你认为索赔能否成立？
[参考答案]
（1）承运人应当承担责任。因为承运人和收货人的关系依提单确定，清洁提单项下的货物因包装破损，说明损失是承运人没有尽到良好的管货义务造成的，说明了承运人没有尽到合同项下的最低责任，承运人应当承担赔偿责任。
（2）甲公司直接向乙公司索赔不能成立。因为乙公司取得的是清洁提单，说明包装破造成的货损原因不在乙公司。
[解析]
承运人是否应承担责任，取决于承运人和收货人的法律关系。二者的关系由提单来确定。承运人签发清洁提单，说明货物表面状况良好。根据《中华人民共和国海商法》（以下简称《海商法》），清洁提单是承运人已经按照提单所载状况收到货物或者货物己装船的初步证据；对于承运人向收货人提出的与提单所载状况不符的证据，不予承认。承运人有妥善、谨慎地保管货物的义务。货物和提单不符，承运人应当负责。
甲公司和乙公司的关系，依买卖合同确定。甲公司向乙公司索赔，必须证明乙公司没有适当履行合同义务。但是根据清洁提单，可以从法律上推定包装破损造成的货损不是乙公司造成的，而是承运人造成的。因此，直接向乙公司索赔不能成立。甲公司应该向承运人索赔。
⑷ 司考国际经济法：几种主要贸易术语
FCA（货交承运人）。该术语是适用最广泛的一个贸易术语，可以适用于一切运输方式。此外其交货分两种情况，卖方承担不同的责任。
FOB（装运港船上交货）。FOB术语后标出的是装运港的名称。如FOB上海，表明该批货物的装运港是上海。
CIF和CFR.CIF是常用的一个贸易术语，与FOB不同，CIF术语后标明的是卸货港的名称，如CIF大连，表明该批货物的卸货港是大连。
CPT和CIP.CPT指卖方向其指定的承运人交货，但卖方还必须支付将货物运至目的地的运费。货物的风险自货物交给第一承运人时转移。在法律特征上CPT与CFR对应，不同的是CFR只适用于海运和内河航运，而CPT适用于各种运输方式。
⑸ 一个国际经济法问题:CIF中的运费问题.举例说明一下.谢谢!
CIF价格术语是卖方承担到目的港的运费和保险费——如果从大同运煤到日本，无论在哪个中国港口装运，那么，到目的港的一切运费（包括从大同到日本的港口）都由卖方承担。
⑹ 国际经济法问题：在海上货物运输中，托运人向承运人出具保函，保证货物符合合同约定，若最终承运人向收货
额…这两个问题都要看投保的是什么 是海牙规则 维斯比规则 还是汉堡规则。不同的头保内容，对保函的保护程度不一样。找保险公司就行 追偿是保险公司的事
⑺ 国际经济法的一道综合题，求详细答案吖！感激不尽！！！
简单
1、航行过失，海牙规则下船方免责，平安险下保险也免责。
2、修回船费用，共同海损，均摊。答
3、60%货物，船方承担。
4、10%卖方或船方承担，这里比较复杂，看船方是否开出的是清洁提单而承担方会不同。
5、FCA和FOB一样，只不过FCA是非水联运，通常买方投保。
6、水渍险就可以得到赔偿。
⑻ 国际经济法中13个贸易术语运输合同都是买方订立么
当然不是。
买方负责安排主运输的术语：EXW/FCA/FAS/FOB
卖方负责安排主运输的术语：CFR/CIF/CPT/CIP/DAF/DES/DEQ/DDU/DDP
谁安排运输，谁回订立运输合答同。
简单来说，就是E组/F组是买方负责安排主运输，C组/D组是卖方负责主运输。
⑼ 关于国际经济法的一道案例题
（1）有理，应支付。（2）可以，只要有明确的受约束的意思表示即可。
“天不想亮”你懂不懂啊？这是英国法判例上大名鼎鼎的薰剂案！
Carlill Vs. Carbolic smoke ball
The Full decision of the case
APPEAL from a decision of Hawkins, J.(2)
The defendants, who were the proprietors and vendors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball," inserted in the Pall Mall Gazette of November 13, 1891, and in other newspapers, the following advertisement: "100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. 1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.
"During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.
"One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10, post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5 Address, Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London."
The plaintiff, a lady, on the faith of this advertisement, bought one of the balls at a chemist’s, and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. Hawkins, J., held that she was entitled to recover the 100 The defendants appealed.
Finlay, Q.C., and T. Terrell, for the defendants. The facts shew that there was no binding contract between the parties. The case is not like Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. Ad. 621), where the money was to become payable on the performance of certain acts by the plaintiff; here the plaintiff could not by any act of her own establish a claim, for, to establish her right to the money, it was necessary that she should be attacked by influenza - an event over which she had no control. The words express an intention, but do not amount to a promise: Week v. Tibold. 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.). The present case is similar to Harris v. Nickerson. Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 286. The advertisement is too vague to be the basis of a contract; there is no limit as to time, and no means of checking the use of the ball. Anyone who had influenza might come forward and depose that he had used the ball for a fortnight, and it would be impossible to disprove it. Guthing v. Lynn 2 B. Ad. 232 supports the view that the terms are too vague to make a contract, there being no limit as to time, a person might claim who took the influenza ten years after using the remedy. There is no consideration moving from the plaintiff: Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476. The present case differs from Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860, for there an overt act was done by the plaintiff on the faith of a statement by the defendants. In order to make a contract by fulfilment of a condition, there must either be a communication of intention to accept the offer, or there must be the performance of some overt act. The mere doing an act in private will not be enough. This principle was laid down by Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. The terms of the advertisement would enable a person who stole the balls to claim the reward, though his using them was no possible benefit to the defendants. At all events, the advertisement should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants. But, if there be a contract at all, it is a wagering contract, as being one where the liability depends on an event beyond the control of the parties, and which is therefore void under 8 9 Vict. c. 109. Or, if not, it is bad under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as being a policy of insurance on the happening of an uncertain event, and not conforming with the provisions of that section.
Dickens, Q.C., and W. B. Allen, for the plaintiff. [THE COURT intimated that they required no argument as to the question whether the contract was a wager or a policy of insurance.] The advertisement clearly was an offer by the defendants; it was published that it might be read and acted on, and they cannot be heard to say that it was an empty boast, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. The offer was ly accepted. An advertisement was addressed to all the public - as soon as a person does the act mentioned, there is a contract with him. It is said that there must be a communication of the acceptance; but the language of Lord Blackburn, in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666, shews that merely doing the acts indicated is an acceptance of the proposal. It never was intended that a person proposing to use the smoke ball should go to the office and obtain a repetition of the statements in the advertisement. The defendants are endeavouring to introce words into the advertisement to the effect that the use of the preparation must be with their privity or under their superintendence. Where an offer is made to all the world, nothing can be imported beyond the fulfilment of the conditions. Notice before the event cannot be required; the advertisement is an offer made to any person who fulfils the condition, as is explained in Spencer v. Harding Law Rep. 5 C. P. 561. Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621 shews strongly that notice to the person making the offer is not necessary. The promise is to the person who does an act, not to the person who says he is going to do it and then does it. As to notice after the event, it could have no effect, and the present case is within the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. It is urged that the terms are too vague and uncertain to make a contract; but, as regards parties, there is no more uncertainty than in all other cases of this description. It is said, too, that the promise might apply to a person who stole any one of the balls. But it is clear that only a person who lawfully acquired the preparation could claim the benefit of the advertisement. It is also urged that the terms should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants; but that is not the import of the words, and there is no reason for implying such a limitation, an increased sale being a benefit to the defendants, though effected through a middleman, and the use of the balls must be presumed to serve as an advertisement and increase the sale. As to the want of restriction as to time, there are several possible constructions of the terms; they may mean that, after you have used it for a fortnight, you will be safe so long as you go on using it, or that you will be safe ring the prevalence of the epidemic. Or the true view may be that a fortnight’s use will make a person safe for a reasonable time.
Then as to the consideration. In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476, Lord Campbell never meant to say that if there was a direct invitation to take shares, and shares were taken on the faith of it, there was no consideration. The decision went on the form of the declaration, which did not state that the contract extended to future holders. The decision that there was no consideration was qualified by the words "as between these parties," the plaintiff not having alleged himself to be a member of the class to whom the promise was made.
Finlay, Q.C., in reply. There is no binding contract. The money is payable on a person’s taking influenza after having used the ball for a fortnight, and the language would apply just as well to a person who had used it for a fortnight before the advertisement as to a person who used it on the faith of the advertisement. The advertisement is merely an expression of intention to pay 100 to a person who fulfils two conditions; but it is not a request to do anything, and there is no more consideration in using the ball than in contracting the influenza. That a contract should be completed by a private act is against the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 692. The use of the ball at home stands on the same level as the writing a letter which is kept in the writer’s drawer. In Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860 the fact was ascertained by a public, not a secret act. The respondent relies on Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621, and the other cases of that class; but there a service was done to the advertiser. Here no service to the defendants was requested, for it was no benefit to them that the balls should be used: their interest was only that they should be sold. Those cases also differ from the present in this important particular, that in them the service was one which could only be performed by a limited number of persons, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining with whom the contract was made. It is said the advertisement was not a legal contract, but a promise in honour, which, if the defendants had been approached in a proper way, they would have fulfilled. A request is as necessary in the case of an executed consideration as of an executory one:
Lampleigh v. Braithwait 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. pp. 153, 157, 159; and here there was no request. Then as to the want of limitation as to time, it is conceded that the defendants cannot have meant to contract without some limit, and three limitations have been suggested. The limitation "ring the prevalence of the epidemic" is inadmissible, for the advertisement applies to colds as well as influenza. The limitation "ring use" is excluded by the language "after having used." The third is, "within a reasonable time," and that is probably what was intended; but it cannot be deced from the words; so the fair result is that there was no legal contract at all.
看不懂？我给你大致讲一下。法官是这么说的，虽然说广告是对不特定人提出的，一般情况下属于要约邀请（ITT），但是本案中，被告不仅将悬赏内容写得十分具体，而且已经把1000英镑存进银行，充分显示出它愿意受到该广告内容的约束（to be bound）,所以符合了要约的根本特征，即受约束的意思表示。所以，本案中的广告是一个要约。而原告通过购买并使用薰剂的行为作出了行为承诺。有要约，有承诺，这个合同就成立了。
英美法教材用这个案例来说明，要约不一定要向特定人发出，只要有明确的受约束的意思表示即可。
⑽ 国际经济法案例分析，寻求答案一 （专业，全面）
撤回是要约送达对方前或同时撤回通知抵达对方方可生效。 撤销是必须在对方承诺前撤销，当要约是不可撤销的情况下，在有效期限内不可撤销。 因此本案例中，A已赶在B收到要约前将撤回通知送达B处，因此，B在下午收到的要约无效。因此本案例中合同不成立。